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Sherman: Child Custody Jurisdiction and the Parental Kidnapping Prevention

CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION AND THE
PARENTAL KIDNAPPING PREVENTION
ACT-A DUE PROCESS DILEMMA?
Sandra Brown Sherman*

I.

INTRODUCTION

The recently enacted Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act
(PKPA)' raises again the question of whether personal jurisdiction over
both parents is a constitutional prerequisite to an enforceable child custody decree. The Act, which embraces most of the Uniform Child Cus-2
tody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) already enacted by forty-seven states,
* B.M.E. Indiana University; J.D., University of Illinois; LL.M., University of Illinois.
1. Pub. L. No. 96-611, §§ 6-10, 94 Stat. 3566, 3568-73 (1980) (to be codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738A and various sections of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1397) [hereinafter cited
as PKPA]. The Act is included with amendments to the Social Security Act. The section of the
law which contains the Social Security amendments specifies the effective date as July 1, 1981. It
is not clear whether this effective date applies to the entire law or only to the Social Security
amendments. The law was signed December 28, 1980.
2. These statutes are based on the UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT, 9 U.L.A. 111
(1979) [hereinafter cited as UCCJA]. ALA. CODE §§ 30-3-20 to -44 (Supp. 1981); ALASKA STAT.
§§ 25.30.010-.190 (1977); ARz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 8-401 to -424 (Supp. 1981-1982); ARK. STAT.
ANN. §§ 34-2701 to -2726 (Supp. 1981); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 5150-5174 (West Supp. 1982); COLO.
REV. STAT. §§ 14-13-101 to -126 (1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 46b-90 to -114 (West Supp.
1981); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, §§ 1901-1925 (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 61.1302-.1348 (West
Supp. 1982); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 74-501 to -525 (1981); HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 583-1 to -26 (1976);
IDAHO CODE §§ 5-1001 to -1025 (1979); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, §§ 2101-2126 (1979); IND. CODE
§§ 31-1-11.6-1 to .6-24 (1980); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 598A.1-.25 (West 1981); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 38-1301 to -1326 (1981); Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 403.400-.630 (Supp. 1980); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 13:1700-:1724 (West Supp. 1982); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §§ 801-825 (1981); MD. ANN.
CODE art. 16, §§ 184-207 (1981 Supp.); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 600.651-.673 (1981); MINN. STAT.
§§ 518A.02-.25 (1982); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 452.440-.550 (Vernon Supp. 1982); MONT. CODE ANN.
§§ 40-7-101 to -125 (1979); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 43-1201 to -1225 (Supp. 1980); NEV. REV. STAT.
§§ 125A.010-.250 (1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 458-A:I-:25 (Supp. 1979); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 2A:34-28 to -52 (West Supp. 1981-1982); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-10-1 to -24 (Supp. 1981); N.Y.
DOM. REL. LAW §§ 75-a to -z (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 50A-1 to -25
(Supp. 1981); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-14-01 to -26 (1981); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3109.21-.37
(Baldwin Supp. 1980); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, §§ 1601-1627 (Supp. 1980); OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 109.700-.930 (1979); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 2301-2325 (Purdon Supp. 1980-1981); R.I. GEN.
LAWS §§ 15-14-I to -26 (1981); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 20-7-782 to -830 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1981);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 26-5-5 to -52 (Supp. 1981); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 36-1301 to -1325
(Supp. 1981); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-45c-1 to -26 (Supp. 1981); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1031-
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requires that states recognize a custody decree rendered by another
state which has correctly assumed jurisdiction under the Act's provisions. 3 Like the UCCJA, the new federal Act, in some cases, requires
the recognition of a determination made without personal jurisdiction
over both parents.4 It is not clear whether such recognition comports
with due process in light of the 1953 Supreme Court opinion in May v.
Anderson.' In May, the Court indicated that due process forbids the
recognition of a custody decree entered without personal jurisdiction
over the absent parent. Nevertheless, the UCCJA drafters chose not to
include a personal jurisdiction requirement in the UCCJA6 and this
omission is perpetuated in the PKPA. It is therefore necessary to reexamine May and evaluate its implications regarding the constitutionality of the PKPA.
1051 (Supp. 1981); VA. CODE §§ 20-125 to -146 (Supp. 1981); VASH. REV. CODE §§ 26.27.010-.930
(Supp. 1982); W. VA. CODE §§ 48-10-1 to -26 (Supp. 1981); Wis. STAT. §§ 822.01 -.25 (1977);
Wyo. STAT. §§ 20-5-101 to -125 (1977). Although not yet enacted in Massachusetts, the courts of
that state also follow the Act. See Murphy v. Murphy, - Mass. -, 404 N.E.2d 69,72 (1980); Doe
v. Roe, 377 Mass. 616, -, 387 N.E.2d 143, 145 n.3 (1979).
3. PKPA, Pub. L. No. 96-611, § 8(a)(a), 94 Stat. 3566, 3569 (1980). More specifically, the
Act requires recognition of a decree rendered by another state if the rendering state had jurisdiction under its own law, id. § 8(a)(c)(l), 94 Stat. at 3570, and under the PKPA. The PKPA provides that a state may assert jurisdiction if: 1) It is the home state of the child, id. § 8(a)(c)(2)(A),
94 Stat. at 3570; 2) providing no home state exists, the child and one contestant have a significant
connection with the state and substantial evidence relative to the custody determination is available there, id. § 8(a)(c)(2)(B), 94 Stat. at 3570; 3) the child is present in the state and has been
abandoned or abused, id. § 8(a)(c)(2)(C), 94 Stat. at 3570; or, 4) no other state can assert jurisdiction, id. § 8(a)(c)(2)(D), 94 Stat. at 3570. Furthermore, continuing jurisdiction remains exclusive if
the child or any parent remains in the state of the previous decree. Id. §§ 8(a)(c)(2)(E), (a)(d), 94
Stat. at 3570-71. These PKPA provisions reflect the provisions of UCCJA §§ 3, 14, 9 U.L.A. 12223, 153-54 (1979), with two important exceptions. The PKPA establishes with more specificity
those situations to which continuing jurisdiction is applicable or should be deferred. In comparison, the corresponding UCCJA provision is more vague. It allows for the exercise of continuing
jurisdiction and deference to this jurisdiction if the state would still have jurisdiction "substantially in accordance with" the UCCJA. Id. § 14, 9 U.L.A. at 153-54. Also, the PKPA establishes
definite priorities in its jurisdictional scheme. For example, "significant connection-substantial
evidence" jurisdiction, PKPA, Pub. L. No. 96-611, § 8(a)(c)(2)(B), 94 Stat. 3566, 3570 (1980), can
only be invoked if there is no home state. In contrast, the UCCJA would permit the exercise of
jurisdiction concurrently by the home state, UCCJA § 3(a)(1), 9 U.L.A. 122 (1979), and a state
asserting the existence of a significant connection to and substantial evidence regarding the controversy. Id. § 3(a)(2), 9 U.L.A. at 122. To the extent that the federal law would preempt a state
version of the UCCJA, this concurrent jurisdiction problem should no longer arise.
4. See the hypothetical situation discussed infra pp. 716-17.
5. 345 U.S. 528 (1953).
6. See Bodenheimer, The Uniform ChildCustody JurisdictionAct: A Legislalive Remedyfor
Children Caught in the Conflict 0(Laws, 22 VAND. L. REv. 1207, 1232-33 (1969). Bodenheimer
cites the difficulty in drafting a suitable long-arm provision and the problems in constructing
uniform custody legislation around a personal jurisdiction requirement as reasons for the commissioners' decision not to include a personal jurisdiction requirement in the Act.
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II.

THE MEANING OF MAY V ANDERSON

In May, the parents had separated, the father remaining in Wisconsin and the mother moving to Ohio with the children. The father
sought a divorce and custody of the children in Wisconsin. The mother
was notified, but never participated in the proceeding.7 Wisconsin

granted the divorce and awarded custody to the father. The father
sought Ohio enforcement of the Wisconsin decree. The Ohio court ex-

tended full faith and credit to the decree s and the Supreme Court
reversed. 9

At issue in May was the "validity of the decree as to custody"' 0 or,
stated otherwise, "whether a court of a state, where a mother is neither

domiciled, resident nor present, may cut off her immediate right to the
care, custody, management and companionship of her minor children
without having jurisdiction over her in personam."

Justice Burton,

delivering the opinion of the Court, focused on the validity of the Wisconsin decree rather than on Ohio's power (or absence of power) to

recognize it. In a previous case, Estin v. Estin,12 the Court had upheld
the validity of a Nevada exparte divorce, but held that the Nevada
court was powerless to affect the absent spouse's right to support.' 3 The
Court in May applied the Estin holding to the custody situation, noting
that the absent spouse's right to custody was entitled to at least as much

protection as the right to alimony. 4 The children's not being domiciled in Wisconsin was not considered to ,be crucial, for the Court

stated that even if Wisconsin were their domicile, "that [would] not
7. It should be noted that there was no available long-arm provision which might have
brought the mother within the reach of Wisconsin's jurisdiction. In this case, Wisconsin law provided that personal jurisdiction could only have been obtained by service on the mother within the
state. See 345 U.S. at 531 n.3. If a long-arm statute had been available, the mother would undoubtedly have been subject to Wisconsin jurisdiction.
8. The trial court considered itself obligated to recognize the decree under the full faith and
credit clause. The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed. 91 Ohio App. 557, -, 107 N.E.2d 358, 362
(1952). The Supreme Court of Ohio refused to hear the case on the grounds that no constitutional
question was presented. 157 Ohio St. 436, -, 105 N.E.2d 648, 648 (1952).
9. 345 U.S. at 535.
10. Id. at 531.
11. Id. at 533 (emphasis in original).
12. 334 U.S. 541 (1948).
13. Id. at 548-49.
14. 345 U.S. at 534. The Court's reasoning that the May holding necessarily follows from the
decision in Estin has been criticized on the basis that the custody determination involves consideration of the best interests of the child, a consideration not at issue in the alimony proceeding. See,
e.g., E. SCOLFS & P. HAY, HANDBOOK ON CONFLICT OF LAWS § 15.31 (5th ed. 1982 expected
publication date); Hazard, May v. Anderson: Preambleto Family Law Chaos, 45 VA. L. REv. 378
(1959).
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give Wisconsin, certainly as against Ohio, the personal jurisdiction that
it must have in order to deprive their mother of her personal right to
their immediate possession."' 5 The Court's use of the word "must"
indicates that personal jurisdiction over the absent parent is required in
order to create an enforceable custody decree. This personal jurisdiction requirement is the essence of Justice Burton's opinion.
The import of the opinion is diminished by Justice Frankfurter's
concurrence. In his concurrence, Justice Frankfurter stated that he
joined in the majority opinion, but went on to say that the only thing
the Court had decided was that Ohio may refuse to recognize the Wisconsin decree, not that it must. 16 Justice Frankfurter's explanation is
plainly at odds with the opinion in which he joined. The majority
opinion reversed the Ohio holding that recognition be granted. If Ohio
had the option to recognize or not recognize the Wisconsin decree, as
Justice Frankfurter contended, reversal would not have been indicated.
Furthermore, Justice Jackson in his dissent indicated that he understood the majority opinion to hold that the Constitution prohibited
Ohio's recognition of the Wisconsin decree because of Wisconsin's lack
of jurisdiction over the mother. 7 Despite Justice Frankfurter's concurrence, it remains inescapable that a majority of the Court endorsed Justice Burton's opinion holding that personal jurisdiction over the absent
parent is a due process prerequisite to an enforceable custody decree. 18
Since the Supreme Court has yet to overrule May, it seems illadvised to draft child custody legislation that requires recognition of
decrees rendered without personal jurisdiction over both parents. Yet
under both the PKPA and the UCCJA, a situation could arise where
recognition of such a decree would be required.' 9 A hypothetical illustrates this problem. Suppose an initial custody determination in State
15. 345 U.S. at 534 (emphasis added).
16. Id. at 535 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
17. Id. at 536-37 (Jackson, J., dissenting).

18. Also noting that the May decision rests on due process grounds are: H. CLARK, THE LAW
OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS INTHE UNITED STATES 323 (1968); E. SCOLES & P. HAY, supra note 14,
at § 15.30; Note, Long-Arm Jurisdictionin Alimony and Custody Cases, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 289,

316 (1973); Note, May v.Anderson, 38 MINN. L. REV. 273, 276 (1954). See also Weintraub, Texas
Long-Arm Jurisdictionin Family Law Cases, 32 Sw. L.J. 965, 972-73 (1978) (under May, it is
unclear whether a forum can give full faith and credit to a decree rendered by another state which

did not have personal jurisdiction over the contesting parent).
19. The potential conflict between the constitutional basis of the May holding and the
UCCJA is noted in Foster & Freed, ChildSnatching and CustodialFights: The Casefor the Uniform Child Custody JurisdictionAct, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 1011, 1021 (1977); Comment, The Due
Process Dilemma of the Uniform Child Custody JurisdictionAct, 6 OHIO N.U.L. REv. 586, 589
(1979).
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A gives custody of the children to the mother during the school year
and the father during the summer. Subsequent to this decree, the
20
mother and children move to State B; the father moves to State C.
After the children have been with the mother in State B for more than
six months, the mother brings a modification proceeding in State B requesting that the father's summer visitation be limited to two weeks.
State B assumes jurisdiction under the "home state" provision. 21 The
father is notified of the proceeding but refuses to appear. No long-arm
provision is invoked. 22 State B grants the mother's request for modification. At the beginning of the summer, the mother sends the children
to visit the father for what she expects will be a two-week visit. Instead,
the father indicates his refusal to return them until the summer's end.
Pursuant to recognition requirements2 3 in effect in State C, the mother
seeks State C's enforcement of the modification. The father raises a
due process defense, alleging that the modification is unenforceable because of State B's lack of personal jurisdiction over him. Given the
implication of May, nonrecognition appears constitutionally compelled

despite PKPA and UCCJA requirements to the contrary.
III.

THE RELEVANCE OF

M4y TODAY

As noted earlier, the UCCJA drafters chose not to reconcile the

UCCJA with the majority opinion in May, although they recognized
the potential conflict.2 4 Furthermore, this conflict was apparently not
addressed by Congress when it passed the PKPA. The UCCJA draft25
ers, however, were not alone in their approach to May. Many cases
20. State A would no longer have jurisdiction to modify the custody decree since PKPA, Pub.
L. No. 96-611, § 8(a)(d), 94 Stat. 3566, 3570-71 (1980), permits the exercise of continuing jurisdiction only if the child or a parent remains in the state. Similarly, UCCJA § 14, 9 U.L.A. 153-54
(1979), would also be inapplicable since it permits the exercise of continuing jurisdiction only if
the state would still have jurisdiction substantially in accordance with the UCCJA.
21. State B could assert "home state" jurisdiction under PKPA, Pub. L. No. 96-611,
§ 8(a)(c)(2)(A), 94 Stat. 3566, 3570 (1980), or UCCJA § 3(a)(1), 9 U.L.A. 122 (1979), since the
children have lawfully lived in State B for at least six months immediately preceding the modification action. This definition of "home state" is expressed in PKPA § 8(a)(b)(4), 94 Stat. at 3570,
and UCCJA § 2(5), 9 U.L.A. at 119.
22. Both the PKPA, Pub. L. No. 96-611, § 8(a)(e), 94 Stat. 3566,3571 (1980), and the UCCJA
§ 4, 9 U.L.A. 129-30 (1979), require only that reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard be
given the absent parent. Notice having been given, neither act requires further action on the part
of the mother to bring the father into the State B proceeding.
23. Both PKPA, Pub. L. No. 96-611, § 8(a)(a), 94 Stat. 3566, 3571 (1980), and UCCJA § 13,9
U.L.A. 151 (1979), require recognition of a decree rendered consistent with those respective acts,
therefore, recognition would be required in this hypothetical.
24. See Bodenheimer, supra note 6.
25. See, e.g., cases cited infra note 28.
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and much of the commentary 26 reflect the view that no due process
obstacles are presented when custody is determined without personal
jurisdiction over both parents. In support of this position, May's detractors pose two main arguments: 1) That the decision was not one of
constitutional dimension; or 2) that even if the decision did have constitutional underpinnings, the Supreme Court would not accept the May
holding today insofar as it emphasizes the protection of parental rather
than children's rights.
One theory proposes that the real holding of May is expressed in
the Frankfurter concurrence, that there is no constitutional impediment
to the recognition of a decree rendered without personal jurisdiction
over a parent, but recognition is not required. 27 The concurrence has
been followed by several state courts.28 Nevertheless, this reluctance to
accept the Burton opinion is based more on philosophical differences
with its position than on a rational and thoughtful interpretation of the
case. The fact remains that Justice Frankfurter is the only justice who
espoused the reasoning expressed in his concurrence, and Justice Burton's opinion enjoyed the assent of a majority of the Court (including
Frankfurter).29 For these and other reasons, many state courts have
chosen to follow the majority opinion. 0
26. See, e.g., Bodenheimer & Neeley-Kvarme, JurisdictionOver Child Custody andAd ption
After Shaffer and Kulko, 12 U.C.D. L. Rv. 229 (1979); Comment, supra note 19.
27. The UCCJA drafters cited the Frankfurter concurrence in support of their position that
personal jurisdiction is not required. UCCJA § 13 comment, 9 U.L.A. 152 (1979).
28. See Perry v. Ponder, 604 S.W.2d 306, 320 (rex. Civ. App. 1980). Also recognizing as
valid a decree rendered without personal jurisdiction is Titus v. Superior Court, 23 Cal. App. 3d
792, 798, 100 Cal. Rptr. 477, 482 (1972) (only children's presence, not parents', required to create
recognizable decree).
29. This is true despite repeated references in the cases and commentary to the Burton "plurality" opinion. See, e.g., Perry v. Ponder, 604 S.W.2d 306, 320 (rex. Civ. App. 1980); Note, LongArm Jurisdiction in Alimony and Custody Cases, 73 COLUM. L. Rv. 289, 316 (1973); Comment,
Developments in the Law-The Constitutionand the Family, 93 HARv. L. Rev. 1156, 1248 (1980).
The court 'n Perry goes so far as to suggest that the Frankfurter concurrence represents the opinion of the Court under the rationale that it was the narrowest ground deciding the case on which
five Justices assented. 604 S.W.2d at 320 (citing Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977)).
This conclusion is clearly erroneous. Frankfurter's theory enjoyed only his assent, and, as mentioned earlier, he did join in the Burton opinion. The concurrence was not a special one. See
supra text accompanying notes 15-17.
30. See Cooper v. Cooper, 229 Ark. 770,-, 318 S.W.2d 587, 588 (1958) (refusal to recognize
custody decree rendered without personal jurisdiction over father); Boggus v. Boggus, 236 Ga.
126,-, 223 S.E.2d 103, 106 (1976) (refusal to recognize decree rendered without personal jurisdiction over both parents); People ex rel. Lehman v. Lehman, 34 Ill. 2d 286,-, 215 N.E.2d 806, 809
(1966) (court, in dicta, notes its inability to decree custody without personal jurisdiction over both
parents); Batchelor v. Fulcher, 415 S.W.2d 828, 830 (Ky. 1967) (no recognition of custody decree
rendered without personal service on mother); Hutchins v. Moore, 231 Miss. 772, -, 97 So. 2d
748, 753 (1957) (constructive service on grandparents insufficient to create recognizable decree);
McLam v. McLam, 81 N.M. 37, -, 462 P.2d 622, 623-24 (1969) (no recognition of decree ren-
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Others hypothesize that May was overruled sub silentio by the

Supreme Court in Stanley v. Illinois.31 At issue in Stanley was whether
due process required that notice and opportunity to be heard must be
given to the father of an illegitimate child in a parental termination

proceeding. 32 The Court held that absent such protections, the father's
constitutional rights would be violated. The Court did not discuss

whether personal jurisdiction would have to be obtained over an absent
33
father before his rights to his illegitimate child could be terminated.

This failure to impose any personal jurisdiction requirement has led
some to conclude that the Court tacitly held that it is constitutionally
permissible to terminate parental rights without personal jurisdiction
over both parents.34 The argument continues that if it is permissible to
permanently terminate custody without jurisdiction, it would also be
dered without personal jurisdiction over child and one parent); Turner v. Ratloff, 74 Misc. 2d 693,
-, 346 N.Y.S.2d 943, 946 (1973) (recognition denied where no allegation of personal service on
absent party in original proceeding); Lennon v. Lennon, 252 N.C. 659, -, 114 S.E.2d 571, 576
(1960) (refusal to recognize exparte custody order); Pasqualone v. Pasqualone, 63 Ohio St. 2d 96,
-,406 N.E.2d 1121, 1127 (1980) (no recognition of decree rendered without personal jurisdiction
over father); Swope v. Swope, 163 Ohio St. 59, -, 125 N.E. 336, 337 (1955) (refusal to decree
custody in a fact situation similar to May); Exparte Elliott, 114 Ohio App. 533, -, 183 N.E.2d
804, 805-06 (1961) (court will not recognize custody decree without personal jurisdiction over
mother); Dieringer v. Heiney, 10 Or. App. 345, -, 497 P.2d 1201, 1203 (1972) (recognition denied
where no personal jurisdiction in modification action due to inapplicability of continuing jurisdiction); Clayton v. Newton, 524 S.W.2d 368, 372-73 ('ex. Civ. App. 1975) (failure to notify custodial
grandparents creates unenforceable decree). Requiring personal jurisdiction for the creation of
binding custody decrees, but not explicitly acknowledging the May holding are: Ferrari v. Ferrari, 585 S.W.2d 546, 548 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979) (refusing to decree incidents of divorce without
personal jurisdiction over wife and mother); State v. Jones, 349 S.W.2d 534, 537 (Mo. Ct. App.
1961) (without personal jurisdiction over wife and mother, court can adjudicate only divorce and
not child custody).
Other courts have held that although May could prevent recognition of the decree of another
state, it is permissible to adjudicate custody without personal jurisdiction over both parents and to
give that determination effect within the rendering jurisdiction. See Goldfarb v. Goldfarb, 246
Ga. 24, -, 268 S.E.2d 648, 651 (1980) (without personal jurisdiction over the father, custody
decree valid within state despite possible nonrecognition outside state); Hilt v. Kirkpatrick, 538
S.W.2d 849, 851-52 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976) (custody decreed despite lack of personal'jurisdiction,
although possibility of nonrecognition noted). This approach is also suggested in Currie, Justice
Traypor and the Conflict of Laws, 13 STAN. L. REV. 719, 768-69 (1961). Nevertheless, if May
stands for the proposition that due process forbids the enforcement by another state of a decree
rendered without personal jurisdiction over both parents, as it apparently does, then it would
follow that due process also forbids enforcement of such a decree by the rendering state.
31. 405 U.S. 645 (1972). This theory is advocated in Perry v. Ponder, 604 S.W.2d 306, 321
(rex. Civ. App. 1980); Bodenheimer & Neeley-Kvarme, supra note 26, at 251; Comment, supra
note 19, at 589 n.27.
32. 405 U.S. at 647. Both the PKPA, Pub. L. No. 96-611, § 8(a)(e), 94 Stat. 3566, 3570 (1980),
and the UCCJA § 4, 9 U.L.A. 129 (1979), require that notice and opportunity to be heard be given
to contestants.
33. The father did not raise a personal jurisdiction issue. See In re Stanley, 45 Ill. 2d 132, 256
N.E.2d 814 (1970).
34. See Bodenheimer & Neeley-Kvarme, supra note 26.
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permissible to make nonfinal custody determinations short of termination without jurisdiction. One commentator has gone so far as to suggest that since Stanley was decided subsequent to the drafting of the
UCCJA it represents the Court's implicit approval of the UCCJA and
the notification procedures outlined in it.35 Presumably, this rationale
could now be used to defend the PKPA.
Nevertheless, the Court's failure in Stanley to discuss personal jurisdiction may not necessarily contradict May. The father in Stanley
was apparently within the jurisdiction of the Illinois courts, and the
issue was never raised in the case.36 Furthermore, even if the Court
had explicitly held that personal jurisdiction was not required in Stanley, Justice Burton's opinion in May could remain intact. The state has
a greaterparenspatriaeinterest in the termination proceeding than it
has in the parent versus parent custody action.37 The state is a party to
the action, and problems would be presented in requiring the state to
litigate in another state if personal jurisdiction could not be had over
the absent parent-problems which do not arise to the same degree in
private custody litigation.
In termination proceedings, frequently some sort of emergency situation is presented which requires expediency in determining the children's status. The parent (or other person) who previously had charge
of the children often is either unable, unfit, or unwilling to continue to
care for them. If personal jurisdiction were required over the absent
parent, the children's status could be in limbo for extended or perhaps
indefinite periods of time while the state sought personal jurisdiction,
necessitating their placement in temporary foster homes and preventing
their adoption. As previously noted, state officials would be required to
bring the termination proceeding in another state if the absent parent
were beyond the reach of jurisdiction. In the case of absent fathers of
35. Comment, supra note 19, at 589 n.27. The UCCJA was proposed by the commissioners

in 1968. Stanley was decided in 1972. Only one state (North Dakota in 1969) adopted the Act
prior to Stanley. Since the drafters did not have the presumed benefit of Stanley to guide them in

their decision not to follow the May majority, it becomes even clearer that the position they took
with regard to May in 1968 was especially tenuous and one not particularly compatible with
thoughtful drafting.
36. See supra note 33.

37. This greater interest was recognized by the court in In re Appeal in Maricopa County,
Juvenile Action No. JS-734, 25 Ariz. App. 333, 543 P.2d 454 (1975). In this Arizona termination
action, the mother of the child raised the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction over her. The
court held that May was not on point because of the increased parenspatriaeinterest of the state

as a party to the termination action, and that the action could be decided without personal jurisdiction over the mother. Id at -,

543 P.2d at 459-60.
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illegitimate children, long-arm jurisdiction may be less available since
there would be no previous marital domicile on which to base a finding
of minimum contacts.38 It is, therefore, a mistake to assume that the
Constitution would accord the same degree of protection to parents in
termination proceedings that it would to parents in private custody
litigation.
Also, the Supreme Court's failure to reaffirm May in a subsequent
decision does not necessarily reflect the present Court's position on the
issue of the personal jurisdiction requirement in custody litigation.39
Although several cases presenting facts similar to May have been denied certiorari,40 these denials have no precedential significance. Indeed, if a majority so definitely disagreed with the Burton opinion, it
seems that the Court would have overruled it long ago.
Furthermore, persuasive arguments exist supporting the idea that
the Supreme Court regards May as good law today. With the decision
in Shaffer v. Heitner,4 ' the Court initiated a trend in jurisdiction cases
which emphasizes fairness to the defendant even at the expense of the
interest of the plaintiff or the state. In Shaffer, the Court held that "all
assertions of state court jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the
standards set forth in InternationalShoe and its progeny,"'4 i.e., that
38. Jurisdiction might, however, be available if the illegitimate father's relationship with the
mother in the state was sufficient to create minimum contacts with the state.
39. It has been suggested that the Court's failure to cite May in Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187
(1962), indicates an unwillingness on the part of a majority to give continued support to the case.
Batchelor v. Fulcher, 415 S.W.2d 828, 833 (Ky. 1967) (dissenting opinion). At issue in Fordwas
whether full faith and credit was required to be given to a foreign custody decree, 371 U.S. at 18990, not, as in May, whether full faith and credit was prohibited because of due process defects in
the original decree.
40. See, e.g., Anonymous v. Anonymous, 3 N.Y.2d 750, 143 N.E.2d 524, 163 N.Y.S.2d 980
(decree enforced despite absence of father in earlier action), cert denied, 355 U.S. 854 (1957); Eule
v. Eule, 9 Wis. 2d 115, 100 N.W.2d 554 (refusal to recognize decree rendered without personal
jurisdiction over mother), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 988 (1960). In 1980 the Supreme Court granted
certiorari in the case of Webb v. Webb, 245 Ga. 650, 266 S.E.2d 463, cert.granted,449 U.S. 819
(1980), which involved the applicability of the full faith and credit clause to decrees rendered
under the UCCJA. Examination of that case could have led the Court to reconsider May. However, the Court later declined jurisdiction to review the case. 451 U.S. 493 (1981).
41. 433 U.S. 186 (1977). The Court in Shaffer rejected the notion that mere presence of
property in the forum state is always sufficient to invoke personal jurisdiction over the defendant.
Id. at 208-09, 213. The Shaffer holding has since been aflirmed in a number of cases. See Rush v.
Savchuck, 444 U.S. 320, 328-33 (1980) (state may not exercise jurisdiction over an absent defendant by attachment of a contractual obligation of an insurer licensed to do business in the state);
World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 299 (1980) (sale of an automobile which
passes through the forum state is insufficient contact to confer jurisdiction on that state); Kulko v.
Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 94-101 (1978) (father's contacts with forum state did not satisfy requirements of Shaffer).
42. 433 U.S. at 212.
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the defendant must have certain "minimum contacts" with the forum
such that maintenance of the suit would not offend "traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice."43 Shaffer requires that the finding
of minimum contacts be based upon a sufficient nexus between the defendant, the forum, and the subject matter of the litigation." Therefore, if the Shaffer holding does apply to custody adjudication, the
situation presented in the earlier hypothetical involving application of
the PKPA and UCCJA to an absent parent would not seem to provide
sufficient basis for a finding that the requisite minimum contacts existed. 45 In that example, the father's only contact with the rendering
state is the presence of his children there.46 In the absence of other
contacts, there is no defendant-forum nexus, and under Shaffer the exercise of jurisdiction would violate due process.
Nevertheless, there is some support for the proposition that minimum contacts are not a due process prerequisite to a valid custody decree. In footnote thirty of the Shaffer opinion, the Court states: "We
do not suggest that the jurisdictional doctrines other than those discussed in text, such as the particularized rules governing adjudication
of status, are inconsistent with the standards of fairness. 47 Most obviously, this status exception would apply to the granting of the exparte
divorce; its application in custody jurisdiction is less clear. It has been
argued that the exception applies with equal force in custody adjudication,48 and that the "particularized jurisdiction rules" set forth in the
UCCJA (and now the PKPA) satisfy the "fairness" standards set forth
in Shaffer despite the absence of a minimum contacts requirement. 49
43. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).

44. 433 U.S. at 204.
45. The hypothetical is set forth supra pp. 716-17.

46. At least one commentator has argued that the domicile of the child in the forum gives rise
to the necessary defendant-forum nexus. Comment, supra note 19, at 593 (custody status of the
child domiciled in the state seems to create the sufficient nexus among the forum, the litigation,
and the defendant). Cf.Vernon, State CourtJurisdiction:A PreliminaryInquiry into the Impact of
Shaffer v. Heitner, 63 IOWA L. REv. 997, 1007 (1978) (proposing that the marital domicile would

be sufficient to establish the defendant-forum nexus for the exercise of divorce jurisdiction). But

see Ratner, ProceduralDue ProcessandJurisdictionto Adjudicate: (a) Effective-Litigation Values
Ys. The TerritorialImperative (b) The Unform Child Custody JurisdictionAct, 75 Nw. U.L. REv.

363, 414 (1980) (minimum contacts should be viewed as values which facilitate the adjudication
process rather than physical contacts between the forum, the claimant and the claim).
47. 433 U.S. at 208 n.30.
48. See Bodenheimer & Neeley-Kvarme, supra note 26, at 240; Comment, supra note 29, at
1246.
49. Seegeneral Bodenheimer & Neeley-Kvarme, supra note 26, at 240-41; Comment, supra

note 19, at 591.

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol17/iss4/3

10

Sherman: Child Custody Jurisdiction and the Parental Kidnapping Prevention

1982]

PARENTAL KIDNA4PPING PREVENTION 4 CT

Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has done nothing to further define
the limits of the footnote thirty status exception.
Certain factors, however, indicate that child custody disputes, at
least disputes between parents, are not embraced by the exception. It
does not necessarily follow that if the exparte divorce is permissible, so
also is the ex parte custody determination. Marriage is essentially a
consensual relationship; the parent-child relationship is not. If state
law permits the ex parte divorce, and one partner is absolutely unwilling to continue to participate in the marital relationship, the need
for personal jurisdiction over the absent spouse is much less socially
compelling. Given what is considered by one party to be an irremediable breakdown in the marriage, there is less reason to consider the situation of the absent partner. In contrast, in custody adjudication the
issue is which of the two parents can exercise custodial rights in the best
interests of the child. This requires an examination of the circumstances of both parents and necessitates the existence of state power to
hale the absent parent before the court. It has also been suggested that
dissolutions of marriages involve matters of greater social urgency than
do provisional custody arrangements, so that the personal jurisdiction
50
requirement can be dispensed with in the former but not the latter.
Finally, implicit in May is that custody adjudication is not purely
a status proceeding; it involves an adjudication of the personal rights of
the parents to the child rather than merely the status of the child.5 '
Once again, the focus of the question returns to the meaning and applicability of the May holding in present-day custody litigation.
The Supreme Court has established that child support litigation is
not embraced by the status exception. In Kulko v. Superior Court,52 the
Court specifically applied the minimum contacts criteria to an action
for child support against an absent parent and found the defendant's
contacts with the forum state did not justify the assertion of in personam jurisdiction. Although the parties agreed that the minimum
contacts standard was applicable in the case,53 implicit in the Court's
50. See Currie, supra note 30, at 769-70; Note, Supreme Court-1952 Term, 67 HARv. L.

REv. 91, 124 (1953). Butsee Perry v. Ponder, 604 S.W.2d 306, 315 (rex. Civ. App. 1980) (custody
of children is a status or relationship in which the state has an interest no less than in a marriage);

Hazard, supra note 14, at 387 (contending that there is no reason to differentiate so sharply between the two situations regarding a possible personal jurisdiction requirement).
51. This is noted in Comment, supra note 19, at 587-88.
52. 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
53. Id. at 92.
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decision is that personal jurisdiction is required in the support action. 4
Kulko further establishes that mere presence of the child within the
forum state does not create a sufficient forum-defendant nexus to justify the assertion of jurisdiction over the parent.
It has been asserted that Kulko is not on point in the custody situation because the custody decree does not impose the obligation to pay
money.5 6 Apparently, the assumption is that a decree which can take
away the defendant's property entitles a defendant to greater due process protection than a decree which can take away his or her children.
There is some strength to this argument insofar as the "thing" at issue
in the child support action (money) does not have rights in and of itself
as do children. Nevertheless, support, like custody, also affects the children's rights and interests and is determined in accordance with these
rights and interests. Therefore, the distinction is not compelling.
It should be noted, however, that Kulko did not address the issue
of custody jurisdiction.57 This prevents any absolute conclusions as to
the applicability of Kulko to custody litigation.58 Even if Kulko is on
point, the particular fact situation there presented may have justified a
finding that minimum contacts supported the exercise of custody jurisdiction.59 But, in view of May, Kulko could at least indirectly stand for
the proposition that, in custody litigation, assertion of the necessary
personal jurisdiction over the absent parent must be based upon a finding of sufficient contacts of that parent with the forum. 60 Insofar as
54. The Court held that the father did not have the minimum contacts required for the state

to compel an appearance in a child support suit or face a default judgment and reversed the
California Supreme Court's denial of the father's motion to quash service for lack of personal

jurisdiction. Id at 101. A similar conclusion was reached by the Colorado Supreme Court in
Offerman v. Alexander, 185 Colo. 383, -,

524 P.2d 1082, 1082 (1974).

55. "[Tlhe presence of the children. . in California. . . does not mean that California has
personal jurisdiction over the defendant." 436 U.S. at 98. But see supra note 46 for discussion of
support in the commentary for a contrary conclusion at least with regard to custody jurisdiction.
56. See Perry v. Ponder, 604 S.W.2d 306, 312-14 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980). Several cases have

held that personal jurisdiction is required to adjudicate child support but not custody. Blech v.
Blech, 6 Ariz. App. 131, -, 430 P.2d 710, 712 (1967); Johnson v. Johnson, 191 So. 2d 840, 842-43
(Miss. 1966); Noble v. Noble, 160 N.E.2d 426, 427 (C.P. Highland County, Ohio 1959).
57. The defendant did not contest the court's jurisdiction to determine custody. 436 U.S, at
88. See also the California Supreme Court's disposition of the case at 19 Cal. 3d 514, -, 564 P.2d

353, 355, 138 Cal. Rptr. 586, 588 (1977).
58. This is also noted in Bodenheimer & Neeley-Kvarme, supra note 26, at 232.

59. The absent father had consented to have his daughter live with her mother in California
despite a separation agreement which provided that the children would spend the school years
with him. This may have created the requisite minimum contacts and defendant-forum-cause of
action nexus so that California could have exercised custody jurisdiction. See Weintraub, supra
note 18, at 981.
60. See Comment, supra note 19, at 595.
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neither the UCCJA nor the PKPA provide for this, their absolute validity is drawn into question.

One final argument which has been raised to limit the application
of May opines that the holding applies only in the narrow fact situation

which the case presented. 61 More specifically, this theory proposes that
the case is on point only in those situations where custody is deter-

mined by a state in which the children are not physically present.62 Yet
the May opinion did not address the issue of whether the children's
domicile was in Wisconsin, since that issue was considered superfluous

in light of the requirement that Wisconsin have personal jurisdiction
over the mother in order to affect her custody rights. 63 The opinion
does not suggest such a narrow interpretation.'
The various rationales which have been proposed to limit the ap-

plicability of May today rest upon one basic premise held by most of its
detractors: The majority opinion is so anomalous in its requiring this
high due process standard for the protection of parents, that the Court

would never reach the May conclusion again.6 1 Various perceived errors in the reasoning of the May court have been noted, and different
conclusions have been suggested.

It has been proposed that parents require fewer due process protections in custody adjudication since the court's decision is not final
and, therefore, due process does not compel the standard of protection
enunciated in May. 6 6 Yet Kulko required that personal jurisdiction
61. See Cannon v. Cannon, 260 S.C. 204, -, 195 S.E.2d 176, 177-78 (1973) Perry v. Ponder,
604 S.W.2d 306, 320 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980) (both distinguishing May on the basis of the presence
of children in the rendering jurisdiction).
62. In May, Wisconsin determined custody while the children were in Ohio with their
mother. See supra pp. 715.
63. 345 U.S. at 534. If the children were domiciled in Wisconsin, that would result in their
constructive presence in Wisconsin, even if they were actually present in Ohio. It is doubtful
whether the Supreme Court would have made a distinction between constructive presence and
actual presence for purposes of custody jurisdiction. Therefore, when the Court indicates that the
children's domicile is irrelevant in the case, presumably the issue of their actual physical location
would have also been irrelevant.
64. See E. ScoLES & P. HAY, sup -a note 14, at § 15.30; Note, supra note 29, at 312. Regarding the scope of May, an interesting question arises as to whether it applies to nonparents who are
interested parties in the custody action. See In re Fore, 168 Ohio St. 363, -, 155 N.E.2d 194, 200
(1958) (denying recognition to a Louisiana decree rendered without jurisdiction over a nonparent
party and the child).
65. See Comment, supra note 29, at 1248 (noting that many find it "inconceivable" that the
present Court would reaffirm May); Comment, supra note 19, at 593 (describing the May opinion
as "flawed").
66. See generally Comment, Extending 'Minimum Contacts" to Alimony: Mizner v. Mizner,
20 HASTINas L.J. 361, 372 (1968) (discussing due process requirement or alimony judgments
where "defendant conceivably faces a lifetime of litigation").
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based on minimum contacts be obtained over an absent parent in a
support action-also a nonfinal judgment. It seems unlikely then that
the Supreme Court would reject May on this basis. Also, to the extent
the PKPA essentially limits custody jurisdiction to a single state,67
modification will be less easily had, and the decree will become more
final as a practical matter. Therefore, the argument might be made that
the absent parent requires even more due process protection than he or
she did at the time of May. The holding in Kulko also leads to rejection of the argument that May is wrong insofar as it places the interest
of the parent above the parenspatriaeinterest of the state.68 In the
support action, like the custody action, the state is interested in the
child's welfare, yet minimum contacts are required before that state can
exercise jurisdiction over an absent parent and before a valid support
order can be entered.
The Supreme Court's perceived increased concern for children's
rights has also been noted as a reason the present Court would reject
May.69 The cases cited in support of this argument deal with the rights
of illegitimate children,7" foster parents' rights to AFDC,71 and multifamily zoning prohibitions. 72 They do not discuss children's rights per
se. In response to this argument, the holdings in Kulko and Ingraham
v. Wright 73 can be cited as examples where other interests prevailed
over the rights of children. It is not clear that this Court is decidedly
more pro-child than was the May court.7 4
67. The UCCJA provided that in the event continuing jurisdiction was not applicable, jurisdiction could be exercised by the child's home state or by a state that had a significant connection
to the child and one contestant; thus, concurrent jurisdiction remained a possibility in the UCCJA
scheme. See UCCJA § 3(a)(I),(2), 9 U.L.A. 122 (1979). The PKPA provides that "significant
connection" jurisdiction can only be invoked if there is no "home state" jurisdiction. See PKPA,

Pub. L. No. 96-611 § 8(a)(c)(2)(A), (B), 94 Stat. 3566, 3570 (1980). Therefore, the problems of
concurrent jurisdiction, which have plagued custody litigation in the past, should be eliminated.
68. The argument that the interest of the state in which the child was domiciled outweighs

the possessory interest of the parent is proposed in Note, supra note 29, at 310.
69. See Bodenheimer & Neeley-Kvarme, supra note 26, at 251.
70. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977) (illegitimate children's right to inherit from fa-

ther in event of intestacy); Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972) (illegitimate
children's right to father's workmen's compensation); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (ille-

gitimate children's right to bring wrongful death action upon death of mother).
71. Youakim v. Miller, 425 U.S. 231 (1976) (foster parents' right to AFDC despite relation to
children).

72. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 499 (1977) (right of extended family to inhabit
same dwelling).

73. 430 U.S. 651 (1977). In Ingraham, the Court upheld the constitutionality of corporal
punishment of children by public school officials. Id. at 664.
74. In fact, the Supreme Court has on various occasions exhibited its concern for the constitutional rights of parents. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (noting that the integrity of the family unit is protected by due process, equal protection, and the ninth amendment);
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CONCLUSION

The ultimate, and not inappropriate, rationale behind the sentiment against May, is that parental rights should not be allowed to take
precedence over the rights of children in custody actions. 75 The May
holding is seen as compromising the rights of the children since it gives
parents another "weapon" with which to avoid the enforcement of an
adverse decree. Nevertheless, any parent can prevent a successful May
jurisdictional defense to recognition by first obtaining personal jurisdiction over the other parent. In the modification action, the continuing jurisdiction provisions of the PKPA (assuming personal jurisdiction
was obtained in the original proceeding) will often be applicable.
Long-arm jurisdiction may be available. If it is not, the parent can
always litigate in the state where the other parent is either present or
domiciled. In most instances, that state will be in a good position to
consider the best interests of the child vis-A-vis the resident parent.
Thus, the personal jurisdiction requirement which May imposes generally will not compromise the children's interests; it will at the same time
provide much greater protection to the parent against whom the custody proceeding is initiated.
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,485 (1965) (establishing parents' right to use contraceptives
in the privacy of their homes); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (stating that the

liberty to marry and have children is one of the most basic civil rights of man).
75. See H. CLARK, supra note 18, at 324, 326. Hazard, supra note 14, at 387-88.
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